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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROGER L. STRADER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940244-CA

Priority No. 2

:

APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has either "misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or facts,
or ha[s] overlooked some statute or decision which may affect the
result" of the case. See Cummins v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-73,
120 P. 619, 625 (1913) .

Defendant fails to identify a problem

affecting the result of his appeal or to establish that he is
otherwise entitled to a rehearing.

The majority's failure to

include an express ruling on the theft charge in its opinion may be
remedied without the need for a formal rehearing because the
panel's position on the issue is clear on the face of the opinion.
Further, defendant fails to establish the claimed constitutional
violations

arising

"atypical" claim.

from

the

court's

novel

analysis

of

his

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE
THEFT CHARGE IN ITS PUBLISHED DECISION MAY BE CURED BY THIS
COURT WITHOUT A FULL REHEARING WHERE THE PANEL'S POSITION ON
THE THEFT ISSUE IS CLEAR ON THE FACE OF THE OPINION
Defendant first takes issue with the way the majority
framed
11

the

issue

before

it.

The

majority

determined

that

[b] ecause the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of the

plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is whether
the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of
possession of a controlled substance . . . ."

State v. Strader,

No. 940244-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. August 31, 1995) (attached
as Exhibit A) .

Defendant argues that he is also entitled to a

ruling on the trial court's refusal to dismiss the theft charge,
even though that charge was ultimately dismissed as part of the
conditional guilty plea entered below pursuant to State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) . Petition for Rehearing thereinafter
"Petition"] at 3-5. He argues that the Court's failure to provide
a ruling prejudices him because, had he prevailed on appeal, the
conditional guilty plea below would have been withdrawn, leaving
the possession charge dismissed pursuant to the appellate ruling
and the theft charge in tact because no ruling was made. Id. at 34.

However, because defendant did not prevail on appeal, he has

not suffered the claimed prejudice and is not entitled to a
rehearing.
Moreover,

while

defendant's

point

may

warrant

clarification by means of an amended opinion or by withdrawal from
2

publication, the claim does not warrant a full rehearing, as
defendant requests.

Petition at 5.

The appellate panel did not

include the theft charge in its ultimate conclusion, but its
position relative to the charge was clear:
Strader's conduct in giving the incorrect name and a
falsified driver's license to Officer Randall is not
incident to his possession of a controlled substance or,
for that matter, to his accomplishing the theft of the
saw,
Strader, slip op. at 8.
[B]ecause there was no common criminal purpose, the
offense of false identification and the other offenses
with which Strader was charged, in particular the drug
offense to which he pled guilty, are not part of the same
criminal episode. . . ."
Id. at 9.
[G]iving false information to a police officer is simply
not part of a single criminal episode involving the theft
and drug offenses under the definition set out in section
76-1-401. (opinion at 11, concurring).
Id. at 11 (Davis, A.J., concurring).

As the panel recognized,

where offenses are not part of the same criminal episode, none of
the statutes upon which defendant bases his appeal are applicable.
See Utah Code Ann. §§76-1-401, 76-1-502(1), 76-1-403 (1) (a) (1995);
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a), (b) (attached as Addendum B).

Thus,

the panel unanimously believed that the theft charge, like the
possession charge, was not barred by the previous prosecution for
providing false information.

Consequently, the result of "the

appeal would not change, and a rehearing to elaborate on this issue
is not warranted.

3

POINT II
THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATELY BASED ON THE
CLAIM BEFORE IT AND DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN
LITIGANTS; FURTHER, BOTH THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS AND
DEFENDANT'S MORE "EXPANSIVE" ANALYSIS PROVIDE THE SAME
RESULT
Taking his cue from the concurring opinion, defendant
argues that the Court should revisit this case because the majority
opinion utilizes a "double standard" in its interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401(2) and 76-1-403(1) (1995).

Petition at 5-9.

He claims that the majority's bifurcated standard violates his
equal protection rights because it accords disparate treatment to
two classes of litigants: defendants and prosecutors.

Id. at 7.

To the contrary, the majority's analysis distinguishes
primarily between the claims presented to the court, not the party
presenting them.

The majority opinion initially addressed itself

to two types of claims: those involving typical joinder challenges
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(2) and 76-1-403(1) (1995), and
those involving double jeopardy.

Strader, slip op. at 4-7.

The

latter category of claim, in which defendants seek a bar to
multiple prosecutions, focuses on whether multiple trials involve
"the same offense" and receives a "very narrow" review, which
defendant does not challenge.

Id. at 6.

The former category, in

which defendants generally seek severance and occasionally seek
joinder of charges, focuses on the broader concept of "single
criminal episode" and, accordingly, receives a more expansive
interpretation relative to the double jeopardy claims. Id. at 5-6.
As the majority pointed out, an expansive analysis in cases

4

contesting joinder promotes the general joinder intent of the
legislature.

Id.

However, defendant presented neither of these

types of claims.

Instead, he offered a hybrid, citing to the

joinder statutes, but seeking to bar prosecution of two charges.
Id. at 6.

It is because of the hybrid claim that the majority

created an intermediate level of review, making a legitimate
distinction between claims which bar further prosecution and those
which merely bifurcate prosecution.

Moreover, the intermediate

level of review serves to promote the same general joinder intent
as is involved in claims contesting joinder.

Id.

The majority's analysis has not been used before in this
jurisdiction, and neither party briefed this case under that
analysis.
statutes

Instead, the parties
in the manner advocated

focused on interpreting the
in the concurring opinion.

Regardless of the approach used, the result is the same.

As

established in the State's brief and in the concurring opinion,
giving false information to a police officer, theft and possession,
as occurred in this case, are not part of a single criminal episode
even under the expansive reading defendant advocates. Consequently,
in this

case

the majority's

analysis

neither

subverted

the

legislature's statutory guidelines for joinder nor inappropriately
subjected defendant to "multiple prosecutions in multiple forums,"
as he complains.

Petition at 8.

The majority decision appropriately tailors judicial
review to the novel challenge defendant raises to a particular type
of charging situation and does not treat defendant in an arbitrary
5

fashion. Defendant has established neither an equal protection nor
a due process violation, and his petition should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Because defendant has failed to demonstrate his claims of
equal protection and due process violations, and has failed to
establish any problem that affects the result of his appeal, his
petition for rehearing should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /V

day of October, 1995

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney^

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Response were mailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to Robert K. Heineman and David P. S. Mack, Salt Lake Legal
Defender Ass'n, attorneys for defendant/petitioner, 424 East 500
South, Ste. 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
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publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 940244-CA

v.
Roger L. Strader,

F I L E D
(August 31, 1995)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Glenn K. Ivasaki
Attorneys:

Robert K. Heineman and David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Kris Leonard and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson.
ORME, Presiding Judge:
Defendant Roger L. Strader pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1994), but retained his right to appeal the trial
court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Strader claims on appeal that
his prior prosecution on a different charge arising from the same
criminal episode precludes his prosecution for possession of a
controlled substance. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed. On the night of July
21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randall of the West Valley Police
Department was preparing paperwork while sitting in his patrol
car in a parking lot at 3900 West and 3*390 South. At
approximately 11:00 p.m., he observed a vehicle pull into an
adjacent construction site. A man, later identified as Strader,
exited the vehicle, entered a building on the siter returned
carrying an object which he placed in the vehicle, and drove

away. Officer Randall stopped the vehicle and asked Strader, who
was driving, for identification.
Strader stated he had no identification, but gave his name
as Stanley Kent Strader. After Officer Randall questioned him
about the object in the back seat, a circular saw, Strader said
he was picking it up for a friend named Tony Ochoa. Strader's
female passenger left the scene to retrieve his identification
from their nearby apartment. Another man, professing to be Tony
Ochoa, returned with a driver's license issued to Earl Nesbitt,
which contained a picture resembling Strader. However, the
license had obviously been altered. The top lamination layer had
been peeled back to allow insertion of Strader's picture.
Officer Randall placed Strader under arrest for giving false
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1995). After a check on
the vehicle's license plates revealed that the plates belonged to
another vehicle, Officer Randall impounded the vehicle. In the
course of the ensuing inventory search, Officer Randall found a
loaded syringe under the driver's seat and a packet of syringes
in the glove compartment. A canine unit discovered another
syringe under a seat cover. Subsequent tests revealed that some
of the syringes contained methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another
officer found the owner of the circular saw, who identified it as
property stolen from him.
Strader was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on three
charges: giving false identification to a police officer, a
class C misdemeanor; theft, a class A misdemeanor; and possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. He was
subsequently charged by the West Valley City prosecutor with the
misdemeanor false identification offense. He entered a guilty
plea to this charge, in Circuit Court, on September 3, 1992.
The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office later filed charges
for all three offenses. At his arraignment in Third District
Court on September 27, 1993, Strader entered a plea of not
guilty•• Two months later, he filed a motion to dismiss all
charges. The court held a hearing on the motion, at which time
it dismissed the charge for false identification because the. same
charge had already been prosecuted in Circuit Court the previous
year. The court declined to dismiss the remaining counts for
theft and possession of a controlled substance. The following
month, pursuant to a plea agreement, the court dismissed the
theft charge and Strader changed his plea to guilty on the
possession charge. However, Strader reserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to State
v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988).
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In its findings and conclusions issued March 9, 1994, the
trial court determined that Strader's act of giving false
identification to a police officer was not part of the same
criminal episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. 5 76-1-401 (1995),
as the other offenses of theft and possession of a controlled
substance.1 Strader now appeals from the trial court's refusal,
premised on that conclusion, to dismiss all charges.
ISSUE
Because the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of
the plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is
whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge
of possession of a controlled substance, based on its
determination that the charge did not arise from the same
criminal episode as the previously prosecuted charge of giving
false identification to a police officer.2
1.
The trial court made, inter alia, the following conclusions
of law:
3. The defendant gave the false name to the
police officer before the drugs were
discovered and before the theft had been
confirmed. The defendant, by giving a false
name may have been trying to escape
apprehension by the officer but this action
did not have the same criminal objective and
was not related to the theft or the
possession of drugs.
4. The false identification to a police
officer, theft and possession of a controlled
substance charges were not part of a single
criminal episode as defined by S 76-1-401
. . . . There was not a single criminal
objective and they are [subject to] different
statutes, have different elements, would be
prosecuted by different jurisdictions and
have different penalties.
2.
For purposes of illustration and analysis, we will
nonetheless refer to the theft charge later in this opinion in
the context of examining the relationship of the three offenses
to each other. Strader also argues that the inclusion of all
three charges in a single information must be taken as an
admission by the State that all were part of a single criminal
episode. This argument is without merit and we decline to
address it. SSS State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 88^-89 (Utah
1989); State v. Range!, 866 P.2d 607, 611 n.3 (Utah App. 1993).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The "trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of latf," Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah
1990), and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded no
particular deference. See ij|.; Salt Lake Citv v. Emerson, 861
P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993).
ANALYSIS
1.

Applicable Lav

Our starting point is the two-prong definition of ^j^bngle
criminal episode" found in the Utah Criminal Code: "all conduct
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added).
If multiple offenses meet the definition of a single
criminal episode, the applicable charges must "be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with
the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged . . .
[and] may not be separated except by order of the court and for
good cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a), (b).
Additionally, there are two statutes pertinent to joinder of
offenses. If multiple charges result from the same criminal
episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials "unless
the court otherwise orders to promote justice." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(2) (1995). If a defendant has already been prosecuted
for an offense, he or she cannot be prosecuted subsequently for
another offense arising out of the same criminal episode, so long
as the later offense "was or should have been tried under
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution." Jd. § 76-1403(1)(a). However, neither Rule 9.5 nor the referenced statutes
apply if the offenses at issue are not part of the same criminal
episode, in which case a defendant may be properly prosecuted in
separate proceedings.
2.

Scope of Analysis

Strader's appeal is somewhat atypical. It is not the usual
defendant who clamors for all pending charges against him to be
tried together before the same jury. The conventional wisdom
holds that a jury will consider a charge more fairly if untainted
by hearing the details of an entire series of charges pending

940244-CA
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against the defendant.3 In cases determining joinder issues,
defendants typically contest joinder by attempting to show the
offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode and, thus,
that their severance and separate trial motions should have been
granted.
In contesting the separate prosecution of his offenses,
Strader contends the false information offense was part of the
same episode as the theft and drug possession offenses.
Emphasizing that he claims violation of the joinder provisions
found in section 76-1-402(2), section 76-1-403(1)(a), and Rule
9.5(1) rather than a violation of the constitutional double
jeopardy doctrine, Strader argues that ve should take an
expansive view in analyzing whether the multiple offenses indeed
arise from the same criminal episode. As Strader recognizes, the
opposing interpretive model is that suggested by double jeopardy
cases, in which a rather restrictive interpretation is given to
the key term "same offence.11 U.S. Const, amend. V. As is
hereafter explained, neither of these approaches is wholly
appropriate to Strader's,claim.
An expansive interpretation of "single criminal episode19 is
appropriate in cases contesting joinder of multiple offenses.
Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and section 76-1-403(1), while
related to double jeopardy,4 expand the scope of offenses barred
from multiple trials beyond "the same offense" focus in double
jeopardy, s&& State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987),
to all offenses arising from a "single criminal episode."5 An
expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of
Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the

3.
Indeed, a cynic might suggest that if the three charges
would have been brought together initially, Strader would have
moved to sever, arguing that the three offenses were completely
distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they were all
tried together.
4.
Both statutes are found in Part 4 of the Criminal Code,
entitled "Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy." Strader's
counsel noted during the hearing that a double jeopardy argument
was "closely related but a different beast than the one we're
talking about here."
5.
This court has stated that cases considering whether
offenses "are separate for double jeopardy purposes" are not
applicable in single episode cases contesting the court's
decision to join offenses or deny a motion for severance. State
v. Looez. 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah App. 1990).
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defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy.6
See State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993); State v.
Gotfrev. 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979). Also, because
appellate courts review decisions regarding joinder or severance
of offenses only for an abuse of discretion, Germonto. 868 P.2d
at 59; State v. Hacra. 735 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1987), it follows
that the reviewing court would, as a practical matter, take a
broad view of what constitutes a single criminal episode in that
context.
On the other hand, the protection against double jeopardy is
a fundamental constitutional right which prevents a defendant
from being tried more than once for the same crime. U.S. Const,
amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, S 12. Accordingly, review of a
double jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, focusing
on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the same offense
without regard to whether multiple offenses were part of the same
criminal episode. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah
1985) (holding successive burglaries of different areas in one
apartment complex did not comprise the same offense); State v.
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (holding car
theft and failure to stop after traffic violation were distinct
offenses not subject to double jeopardy analysis). See also
State v. James. 631 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1981) (holding double
jeopardy does not prevent multiple convictions for multiple
offenses arising out of single criminal episode)•
On balance, the circumstances of Strader's claim place this
case closer to a double jeopardy analysis than to a joinder of
offenses analysis.7 He contends that a previous prosecution for
6.
Conversely, the trial court has discretion to order separate
proceedings for offenses arising from the same criminal episode
"to promote justice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), and "for good
cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(b). For example, severing
the offenses may be appropriate if joinder would unduly prejudice
a defendant and jeopardize his or her right to due process, gee
State ^. McCumber. 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980).
^

7.
Thus, the cases upon which Strader relies are unpersuasive
because they are of the genre contesting joinder. In state v.
Germonto. 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the defendant contested
joinder of forgery with the charges of murder and robbery. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's denial of the
defendant's severance motion, held that because the forged checks
were stolen from the victim during the murder and robbery, all
three offenses had the common criminal objective of obtaining
property from the victim. X£. at 59. Other cases jsited by
(continued...)
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one offense bars the subsequent prosecution of a different
offense because both are part of the same criminal episode. Such
a claim is comparable to assertingVdouble jeopardy bars a
subsequent prosecution because both proceedings would involve the
same offense. Accordingly, although our focus must be on the
inherently broader term "criminal episode," in the unique posture
of defendant's case we believe it is appropriate to take a
narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what that term entails.
3. Application to Facts
As stated above, "all conduct which is closely related in
time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a
single criminal objective11 comprises a single criminal episode.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-401 (1995). There is no question, nor do
the parties dispute, that both offenses pertinent here satisfied
the temporal requirement of section 76-1-401. Officer Randall
found the illegal controlled substance during a search conducted
pursuant to and immediately after Strader's arrest for giving
false identification. Accordingly, we limit our examination to
the second prong of the statutory definition of a single criminal
episode, i.e., whether the offenses for which Strader was charged
were incident to the accomplishment of the same criminal
objective.
Whether the charge for false identification was incident to
the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge
for possession of a controlled substance depends on the specific
facts of the case viewed under to the totality of the
circumstances.* Additionally, the totality of facts and
7. (...continued)
Strader are similarly inapplicable because they uphold the trial
court's decision to join offenses for trial on the rationale that
they were all part of a single criminal episode. See State v.
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988) (eight charges for sale of
a controlled substance); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah
App. 1990) (murder and child abuse); In re R.D.S.. 777 P.2d 532,
538 (Utah App 1989) (kidnapping, child abuse, and homicide),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1990). Finally, in state -r.
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), the Court considered "single
criminal episode" in the context of admissibility of evidence
rather than joinder or severance of offenses. I£. at 1141.
8.
The totality of circumstances approach is employed in a
variety of criminal law contexts. See; e.g.. state v. Mabe, 864
p.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (determining whether confession was
voluntary under totality of circumstances); State v. Case, 884
(continued...)
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circumstances is viewed objectively to determine whether there
exists a common criminal objective. It would be inappropriate to
decide the question based on whatever subjective intent the
defendant may allege for the offenses at issue* ££. State v.
Arrovo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989) (categorizing "actual
state of mind of the officer" as irrelevant in determining
whether automobile stop was pretextual; objective evaluation
required instead)• Finally, as explained above, in cases like
the instant one our perspective is narrow rather than expansive.
We conclude that Strader#s conduct in giving the incorrect
name and a falsified driver's license to Officer Randall is not
incident to his possession of a controlled substance or, for that
matter, to his accomplishing the theft of the saw.
The only possible nexus between the crimes is an intent to
avoid arrest on the other charges by giving false identification.
Yet Strader was already detained by Officer Randall, who had
observed his involvement in what appeared to be theft activities,
at the time he gave false information. His identity was
inconsequential to his imminent arrest for theft under whatever
name he cared to use. Use of a false identity might have
deflected further problems by way of outstanding warrants,
driving on a revoked license, or other similar legal
entanglements, but it would have no bearing on the officer's
investigative focus on Strader as the perpetrator of a theft
committed in the officer's presence. Strader's suspicious
activities at the construction site and possession of drugs were
not absolved, explained, or mitigated by giving the officer his
brother's name or an obviously altered driver's license.9 Also,

8. (...continued)
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (examining totality of
circumstances to determine whether articulable facts support
reasonable suspicion); Citv of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,
1388 (Utah App. 1994) (basing the determination of exigent
circumstances for warrantless search on totality of
circumstances).
9.
In State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court held that a crime committed to
avoid arrest for a prior crime cannot always be considered as
part of the same criminal episode. The Court later noted that
"our failure to announce that such conduct always warrants
joinder does not preclude us from concluding that under some
circumstances, joinder may be proper." State v. Germonto. 868
P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993).
(continued...)
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the fact he was driving a car with incorrect license plates and
that he had a forged driver's license at hand seem to indicate
that obscuring his identity was an ongoing and routine course of
conduct with Strader and not specifically done to somehow further
his theft or drug possession activities•
Objectively viewing all of the facts and circumstances in a
narrowly focused way, we conclude that because there was no
common criminal purpose, the offense of false identification and
the other offenses with which Strader was charged, in particular
the drug offense to which he pled guilty, are not part of the
same criminal episode for purposes of the issue before us.

9.

(...continued)
In the instant case, the outcome may well have been
different if the facts had created a stronger nexus of purpose
between the offenses. Consider the following two hypothetical
scenarios: In the first, Officer Randall finds a circular saw on
the back seat with a bill of sale made out to "Joe Carpenter" and
Strader tells him that his name is "Joe Carpenter." In the
second hypothetical, Officer Randall observes Strader, carrying a
circular saw, leave a construction site marked with a large sign
reading "Beagle Boys Construction.91 Strader tells him his name
is "Bart Beagle." In both scenarios, the false identification
would be closely connected with the alleged theft activities
because Strader, in order to evade arrest, would be using the
names as a means to explain his legitimate presence at the
construction site and/or his lawful possession of the saw. By
contrast, in the instant case, Strader's use of his brother's
identity and that of Earl Nesbitt did nothing to explain away his
apparently unlawful taking of the saw.
The drug offense is yet a further step removed from
Straders giving false information. But for his arrest under
whatever name on theft charges, he would not have been arrested
and his car searched and the syringes found. Nonetheless, one
can envision a more purposeful connection between giving false
information and possession of a controlled substance, as in this
hypothetical situation: Officer Randall observes syringes in
Strader's car, then asks Strader for identification. Strader
produces a counterfeit police shield and introduces himself as
"Earl Nesbitt, undercover agent with the Metro Narcotics Strike
Force." In this scenario, he would employ a false identity in
order to create a legitimate reason for possessingja controlled
substance.
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CONCLUSION
For the purposes relevant here, the offense of false
identification for which Strader was prosecuted was not part of
the same criminal episode as the offense of possession of a
controlled substance because there was no common criminal
objective. Therefore, sections 76-1-402(2) and -403(1) do not
bar the subsequent prosecution proceedings in district court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

GregoryTC. Orme, Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, £oage

DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in result):
In my view, the Scope of Analysis section of the main
opinion is not only unnecessary to the result but analytically
flawed. Strader is seeking to avail himself of the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. SS 76-1-401 to -40511 (1990); he is nafe claiming
that he was "twice put in jeopardy within the meaning
of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
Moreover, Strader#s reliance upon cases in which the
defendant is contesting joinder is totally appropriate* There is
nothing in the statutes upon which Strader relies that suggests
an "expansive" interpretation where the government is pursuing
joinder or a "very narrow perspective" where the defendant is
attempting to benefit from the statutory provisions.2 Thus, the
majority's application of a double standard for interpreting the
definition of a single criminal episode set out in section 76-1401 is unnecessarily confusing, especially where, as here, either
1.

See note four of the main opinion.

2.
Even if it is assumed that such an approach is appropriate
to an analysis at the constitutional level*

940244-CA
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interpretation would yield the same result. See State v.
Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 59-60 (Utah 1993) (applying "expansive11
interpretation, yet requiring nonetheless, as in the case at bar,
that the theory for joinder "posit[] a single objective
throughout the whole [criminal] episode") (emphasis added).
As stated in the terse, straightforward analysis in the
Application to Facts section of the main opinion, Strader's crime
of giving false information to a police officer is simply not
part of a single criminal episode involving the theft and drug
offenses under the definition set out in section 76-1-401.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to meld a constitutional analysis
with statutory interpretation, even if that exercise were
logip«xiy Suggested by the statute.
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ADDENDUM B

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-401

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 ?2d 447 (Utah
1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. Id. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law I 227.

C.J.S. — 22 CJJS. Criminal Law ( 203.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law a* 152.

76-1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of limitations has run.
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser
and included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not
be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L.
1973, eh. 196, I 76-1-305.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am Jur. 2d Criminal
Law t 225.

CJ.S. — 22 CJJS. Criminal Law § 196.
Key Numbers* — Criminal Law *» 145V2.

PART 4
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE
•JEOPARDY
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of
Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 79-1-401, enacted by I*
1973, eh. 196, I 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, I 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77*21-31,

cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For
the present comparable provision, see Rule 9,
R Crim. P.
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76-1-402

GENERAL PROVISIONS

NOTES TO DECISIONS

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

the criminal objective in the failure to stop was
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Cornish, 671 P.2d 677 (Utah 1977).
Conduct constituting separate
Defendant's actions did not constitute a "sin—Property pawned separately.
gle criminal episode" since he committed two
Traffic ofTenses.
separate burglaries by breaking into two sepaCited.
rate buildings within an apertment complex,
even though the burglaries were only 20
Conduct coftetHutbig single crime.
minutes apart. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174
Retention of stolen property of different indi- (UUh 1985).
viduals is a single act and a single offense if
evidence shows that the items were retained —Property pawned separately.
Where property was stolen and defendant resimultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for ceived and pawned it on three separate days
related offenses, a second prosecution was pre- spread over a period of 18 days, the offenses did
cluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah not arise out of a single criminal episode. State
v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (UUh 1986).
1983).
ANALYSIS

Conduct constituting separate crimes.
Where defendant committed a robbery in one
county, and later, in another county some 66
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and decided to kidnap them aa hostages, the difference in time, location, and the criminal objectives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the
conduct separate crimes rather than one single
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d
1206 (UUh 1977).
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the
failure to stop at the command of a police officer were two separate offenses, and not a single
episode, because the two offenses occurred a
day apart and the criminal objective in the unlawful taking was to obtain possession while

Traffic offenses.

This section does not prevent the prosecution
of a drunk driving charge under ft 41-6-44 after the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving
without a license, without a registration certificate and without a safety sticker, Rince the
ciUtions charge separate offenses entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606
P.2d 253 (UUh 1980).
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896
(UUh 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P 2d 89
(UUh Ct. App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749
P.2d 631 (UUh 1988); Slate v. Fletcher, 751
P.2d 805 (UUh Ct App. 1988); State v. Ortega,
761 P2d 1138 (UUh 1988); State v. Johnson,
115 UUh Adv. Rep. 6 (1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jttr. 2d.
Law i 20.

76-1-402

CRIMINAL CODE

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal

CJ&. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law ft 14.
Key Numbers, — Criminal Law *» 29.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
12

Double jeopardy prohibited for tame offense,
History: C. 1983, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-1-402; L. 1974, ch. 32,ft2. UUh Const, Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const.,
Croes-fleferencc*. — Computer Crime* Act Amend. V; ft 77-1-6.
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating another statute, ft 76-6-704.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Act."
Judgment entered for included offense after reversal of conviction.
Jurisdiction of a single court.
Lesser included offense.
—Aggravated assault.
—Aggravated robbery.
—Attempted homicide.
—Forcible sexual abuse.
—Instructions.
—Joy riding.
—Manslaughter.
—Negligent homicide.
—Thea.
Misdemeanor and felony charges.
Separate offenses.
—Automobile violations.
—Burglary and larc«*ny.
—Remoteness in time.
—Sex offenses.
Cited.
"Act"
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not
only volitional acts of a defendant, but also the
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a

defendant State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct.
App. 1989).
Judgment entered for Included offense after reversal of conviction.
Where there was insufficient evidence to
support defendant's conviction for second degree murder, but there was sufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the included offense
of manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to
this section, vacated and set aside the conviction of second degree murder on appeal and
entered a judgment of conviction for the included offense of manslaughter. State v.
Bindmp, 655 P 2d 674 (Utah 1982).
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk
of death was insufficient to support defendant's
conviction of second degree murder, but there
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to support a conviction of the included offense of
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial
court with directions to set aside the verdict
and to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214
(UUh 1985).
Jurisdiction of a single court
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the

13

76-1-403

GENERAL PROVISIONS

CRIMINAL CODE

the entering did not include and was independent of the larceny; each offense required different acts and former 9 76-1-23 did not preelude conviction on both burglary and larceny
c h a r ^ SUU ». Jone* 13I Utah 2d 36. 368
P 2d 2152 urififi9)
ww
—Remoteness In tine.
Where defendant was charged with theft of
an operable motor vehicle which occurred in
1981 and possession of a stolen vehicle occurring in 1986. because of the remoteness in time
of the two offenses. Subsection (3) cannot bar
convictions of both offenses, as that subsection
is limited to and defined by "separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode." State

v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1987),
cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988).
mmamw
n
~~2?
" T * , , - •» i
. .i
JJ
. ^ f111
™ ' " £ * rf * * £ P»~l™«»" P'^««««
* P* '* contact, and the former act was in no
way necessaryo f to
the latter act, the two acts
wer n o t
*
P«rt t h e Hsame set" and could suprt w 0 c o u n l 8
P° ) 0 8 e a r t t <* aWfravated sexual assault
ba
?~ " P
*m •<*?
of forcible sexual
abuse
y
?"J/7!S5i
*'
*' ? 8 ° P
1 2 3 3 (1989
>Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896
(Utah 1986); State v. Haga. 735 P.2d 44 (Utah
1987); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah
1988); State v. Tuttle, 780 P. 2d 1203 (1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
C J . a — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law I 14.
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
A.L.R. — Seizure or detention for purpose of
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
committing rape, robbery, or similar offense as
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- constituting separate crime of kidnaping, 43
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L A L R 3d 699.
Rev. 177.
Lesser-related state offense instructions:
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal modern statu*. 60 A.L.R.4th 1081.
Law 9 20.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law e» 29.

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution;
and
(b) The former prosecution:
"
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense
is an acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
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76-1-404

(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination
takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal,
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
History: C. 19S3, 76-1-403, enacted by L.
1*73, ch. 196, I 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, I 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

n A -A
. u .,
. ,
,
Conduct constituting single dime.
C Un
Cited
°
Conduct constituting single crime.
Retention of stolen property of different IncHvidusls is a single set snd a single offense
when evidence shows thst the items were retamed simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen
items were the subject of s previous prosecution for related offenses, s second prosecution
wss precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203
(Utah 1983).

This section does not mandate dismissal if
^ ^ properly severed. Thus, where s
magistrate severed counts "to promote justicesnd the district court later refused to rejoin
them for the same reason sfter defendant hsd
fc^ convicted on one of the counts, the esse
^ « l h o u i d h«ve been tried under
w a § noi ^
§ 7 6 . M 0 2 . - State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 44 (Uteh
1907)
ewmt§

CHed In 8tate v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34
(fjuh 1987)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Lsw I 243 et seq.
CJS. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law I 208.
A.L.R. — Prosecution for robbery of one per-

son as bar to subsequent prosecution for robbery of another person committed at the same
time, 51 A.L.R.3d 693.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Lew •» 161.

76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in other
jurisdiction barring prosecution in state.
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction,
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined
17

Rule 9

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, designated as
"(a)" and rewrote the existing provisions, deleting ''other than an infraction" after "offense,"
and added Subdivisions (b) to (e).

310

Cross-References. — Counsel for indigent
defendants, § 77-32-1 et seq.
Defense costs in criminal actions, convicted
defendants may be ordered to pay, § 77-32a-l
et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Determination of indigency.
—Appeal.
Self-representation.
Determination of indigency.
—Appeal.
The determination of indigency is a question
offset to be determined by the trial court; once
that determination has been made, it is entitled to the same presumptions of correctness as
other trial court findings and determinations;
therefore, the person attacking that finding
has the burden to prove it is in error. Webster
v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978).
Self-representation.
Because the exercise of the right to defend
oneself in a criminal prosecution necessarily
constitutes a waiver of the important right to
professional counsel, trial courts have an affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who
chooses self-representation does so knowingly
and intelligently. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724
(Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).
Trial court did not err in allowing defendant
to represent himself, after the court properly
inquired into defendant's wish to represent

himself, and properly took defendant's questionable mental health into account in considering the request. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).
The choice to represent oneself does not automatically give defendant access to research resources enjoyed by professional counsel. State
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, £36 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
A foreign-national defendant had a constitutional right to defend himself if he chose to do
so, notwithstanding his limited understanding
of English and of the U.S. judicial system; the
trial court deprived him of that right when it
applied an incorrect legal standard, considering the defendant's best interests and his technical ability to manage hi6 own defense. Moreover, because the court's determination that
the defendant could not knowingly and intelligently choose self-representation was not supported either by the facts or by any meaningful
inquiry into the defendant's ability to understand the risks of self-representation, the case
was remanded to allow defendant to represent
himself. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah
Ct App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection?
Strickland v. Washington and National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723.
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183.

Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepresentation, or failure to advise, of immigration
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65
A.L.R.4th 719.
What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — federal
80 A.L.R. Fed. 622.

Rule 9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 201, § 2 repealed former i 77-35-9, and thus this rule,
effective April 23,1990. For present comparable provisions, aee § 77«8a-l. See also State v.

Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (applying § 77-8a-l
instead of this rule, finding that the repeal of
the statute operated to repeal the rule).

Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single
court
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arisingfroma single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest
possible penalty of all the offenses charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged,
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses.

